Suresh v GMC [2026]: Clarifying the Limits of a Regulator’s Duty of Care to Registrants

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Suresh v General Medical Council [2026] EWCA Civ 955 is likely to become one of the leading authorities on the liability of professional regulators. Arising from the tragic death of Dr Sridharan Suresh shortly after he was informed that the General Medical Council (“GMC”) had commenced fitness to practise proceedings, the appeal required the Court to determine whether the GMC owed a common law duty of care to a doctor when exercising its statutory investigatory functions. The Court held that it did not.

Although the case concerned the GMC, its significance extends well beyond medical regulation. The Court’s reasoning is founded upon broader principles governing the liability of public authorities exercising statutory functions and is likely to be of considerable importance to other professional regulators. For those advising regulators or registrants, Suresh is likely to become the starting point whenever negligence claims arise from the conduct of a fitness to practise investigation.

The judgment should not, however, be misunderstood. The Court did not hold that regulators owe no legal obligations to those they investigate, nor did it diminish the importance of fairness, lawful decision-making or practitioner welfare. Its conclusion was narrower, but no less significant: the common law of negligence does not impose a private law duty of care upon a statutory regulator in the exercise of its investigatory functions where doing so would conflict with Parliament’s statutory scheme for protecting the public.

This article considers the Court’s reasoning and, more importantly, what the decision means in practice for professional disciplinary proceedings. It argues that Suresh provides welcome legal certainty for regulators whilst simultaneously reinforcing the need for fair, proportionate and compassionate regulatory processes.

Background

The appeal arose from tragic circumstances. In March 2018, an allegation of sexual assault was made against Dr Sridharan Suresh, a consultant anaesthetist. The allegation was referred to the GMC by the police, prompting the regulator to commence an investigation under its statutory fitness to practise procedures. Given the seriousness of the allegation, the matter was also referred to an Interim Orders Tribunal to consider whether any interim restrictions on Dr Suresh’s registration were required pending the outcome of the investigation.

On 2 May 2018, the GMC wrote to Dr Suresh informing him that an investigation had been opened, explaining the allegation and notifying him of the referral to an Interim Orders Tribunal. The correspondence acknowledged that regulatory investigations could be stressful and directed him to sources of professional support. Tragically, later that day, Dr Suresh took his own life. At the subsequent inquest, the Coroner issued a Prevention of Future Deaths Report recommending that the GMC strengthen its approach to identifying vulnerable practitioners and improve the welfare information provided at the outset of investigations. The GMC subsequently implemented those recommendations.

Dr Suresh’s widow and children brought proceedings alleging that the GMC had negligently failed to take reasonable care to avoid causing foreseeable psychiatric injury during the investigatory process. They argued, amongst other matters, that the GMC should have made enquiries into Dr Suresh’s vulnerability, adopted a more sensitive approach to its communications and taken additional steps before commencing formal regulatory action.

Importantly, the Court of Appeal was not asked to decide whether the GMC could have handled the investigation differently or whether aspects of its procedures might have been improved. The central issue was one of legal principle: does a statutory regulator owe a common law duty of care to a registrant when carrying out its investigatory functions? The Court’s answer was no.

The Court’s Decision

The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the GMC does not owe a common law duty of care to doctors when carrying out its statutory investigatory functions. Although the consequences of a fitness to practise investigation may be profound for the individual practitioner, imposing such a duty would be incompatible with the statutory framework established by Parliament.

In reaching that conclusion, the Court applied well-established principles governing the liability of public authorities. It emphasised that the starting point is not whether harm is foreseeable, but whether the common law should recognise a private law duty in the particular statutory context. Where Parliament has entrusted a public body with functions designed to protect the public, the courts will be slow to impose duties that could inhibit or distort the exercise of those functions.

The GMC’s statutory responsibilities illustrate the point. Its overriding objective is the protection of the public, and it is required to investigate allegations that may call into question a doctor’s fitness to practise. Those investigations frequently involve difficult decisions that require the regulator to balance competing interests, assess risk and, where appropriate, take urgent protective action. The Court considered that recognising a duty of care owed to the practitioner under investigation would risk creating conflicting legal obligations and could discourage robust regulatory decision-making in cases where public protection demands prompt action.

The Court also rejected the suggestion that the alleged duty could be confined to the manner in which investigations were conducted. The claimants argued that reasonable care required the GMC to make enquiries about Dr Suresh’s vulnerability, adapt its communications accordingly and take further welfare-related steps before commencing the investigation. The Court concluded that these matters formed part of the investigatory process itself. To impose a private law duty governing how those functions were exercised would still conflict with the statutory scheme and expose regulators to negligence claims whenever difficult investigative judgments were made.

Importantly, the Court did not suggest that practitioner welfare is unimportant. On the contrary, it recognised the significant personal impact that regulatory investigations can have and noted the improvements the GMC had made following the Coroner’s Prevention of Future Deaths Report. The absence of a common law duty of care should therefore not be interpreted as judicial approval of poor regulatory practice. Rather, the decision reflects the constitutional distinction between legal liability in negligence and the standards of fairness, professionalism and compassion expected of a statutory regulator.

What Does This Mean for Professional Regulation?

Although Suresh arose in the context of medical regulation, the Court’s reasoning is likely to resonate across the wider regulatory landscape. Many professional regulators operate under statutory schemes that share common objectives: protecting the public, maintaining confidence in the profession and upholding proper professional standards. Those functions frequently require difficult judgments to be made at an early stage of an investigation, often on incomplete information and in circumstances where competing interests must be balanced. The principles articulated by the Court are therefore unlikely to be confined to the GMC.

For regulators, the decision provides welcome legal certainty. It confirms that carrying out statutory investigatory functions in the public interest will not ordinarily expose them to claims in negligence brought by those under investigation. That allows regulators to focus on fulfilling their statutory responsibilities without the additional concern that every investigative decision may later be scrutinised through the lens of private law liability. It does not, however, diminish the importance of conducting investigations fairly, proportionately and with appropriate regard to the welfare of registrants.

For practitioners and their representatives, Suresh also provides important clarity. Claims founded solely upon alleged negligence in the conduct of an investigation are now likely to face considerable difficulty where the impugned conduct falls within the regulator’s statutory investigatory functions. That does not mean that regulators are beyond legal scrutiny. Decisions remain susceptible to challenge where they are unlawful, procedurally unfair or incompatible with Convention rights. The judgment therefore narrows one avenue of civil liability but leaves intact the broader legal framework governing the exercise of public power.

Perhaps the most significant practical lesson is that legal liability and good regulatory practice are not synonymous. The Court determined the scope of the common law of negligence; it did not prescribe the standards to which regulators should aspire. Effective regulation depends not only upon robust decision-making but also upon transparent communication, procedural fairness and an appreciation of the significant personal impact that investigations can have on practitioners. Regulators who continue to invest in practitioner support and wellbeing are not acting because the law compels them to do so, but because such measures promote better, fairer and more effective regulation.

For those involved in professional discipline, Suresh should therefore be understood as a decision about the constitutional limits of private law liability rather than a retreat from the principles of good administration. The public protection objective remains paramount, but it continues to sit alongside the expectation that regulators will exercise their statutory powers responsibly, proportionately and with humanity.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Suresh v General Medical Council brings welcome clarity to an important area of professional regulation. It confirms that, when exercising statutory investigatory functions, a regulator does not ordinarily owe a common law duty of care in negligence to the practitioner under investigation. In doing so, the Court has reaffirmed the principle that public protection remains the overriding purpose of statutory regulation and that the common law should not impose duties capable of conflicting with that objective.

The decision should not, however, be interpreted more broadly than its ratio permits. It does not relieve regulators of their public law obligations, nor does it diminish the importance of procedural fairness, transparency or appropriate support for vulnerable practitioners. Good regulatory practice demands more than legal compliance alone. The improvements adopted by the GMC following the Coroner’s Prevention of Future Deaths Report illustrate that regulators can, and should, continue to develop processes that are both effective and humane.

For those practising in the field of professional discipline, Suresh is likely to become a leading authority on the limits of private law liability in the regulatory context. Its significance lies not merely in the outcome of this particular appeal, but in the broader confirmation that questions of negligence must be considered through the prism of the regulator’s statutory purpose. As professional regulation continues to evolve, the challenge for regulators will remain the same: to protect the public whilst ensuring that investigations are conducted fairly, proportionately and with appropriate regard for those whose professional lives are profoundly affected by them.